This paper examines how network carriers adjust product quality given the competition from a low cost carrier (LCC). While previous research has shown that product quality (measured by on-time performance) suffers from heightened competition by LCC (Prince and Simon, 2015), our results find the contrary. Network carriers differentiate themselves by offering higher product quality through lower seat density and more first class/business class seating. Network carrier's product quality response to other LCCs depends on market overlap. When considerable overlap exists, network carriers offer higher product quality by reducing seating density and/or increasing the proportion of first class/business class seats.
Introduction
The bulk of the empirical literature studying competition in the airline industry has focused on various aspects of price competition. Examples of early studies conducted in the wake of the industry's deregulation focused on the impact of the hub-and-spoke system on airfares include Borenstein (1989) , Brueckner and Spiller (1994) and Evans and Kessides (1993) . These papers were followed by a series of papers (for example, Brueckner and Whalen (2000) , Brueckner (2003) , Whalen (2007) , Ito and Lee (2007) , Gayle (2008) , Brueckner, Lee, and Singer (2012) examining the impact of code sharing, alliances and antitrust immunity on both domestic and international airfares. More recently, a number of papers (for example, Brueckner, Lee, and Singer (2013) and Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) ) have studied the dramatic impact on prices resulting from competition from low cost carriers (LCCs).
In contrast to the vast literature examining various facets of price competition, less attention has been paid to aspects of non-price competition within the airline industry. The primary exception are a small handful of papers studying the provision of inflight amenities (Kim, Liu, and Rupp (2018) ), schedule competition, either in terms of flight frequency (for example, Brueckner and Luo (2014) , Brueckner (2010) , Wei and Hansen (2005) ), or the timing of when flights depart (Borenstein and Netz (1999) ). In addition, previous work has examined how on-time performance affects pricing (Forbes (2008) , Morrison and Winston (1989) ), the impact of mergers on on-time performance (Prince and Simon (2017) ), how multimarket contact influences on-time performance (Prince and Simon (2009)) , and the role of competition in both on-time performance (Greenfield (2014) , Mazzeo (2003) , Rupp, Owens, Plumly (2006) ) and flight cancellations (Rupp and Holmes (2006) ).
Although price plays a paramount role in a passenger's decision on whether to fly and which carrier to choose, a variety of structural changes over the past decade suggest that non-price elements of competition are playing an increasingly important role. For example, the widespread proliferation of LCCs that began in the early 1990s and has continued unabated to the present day means that most passengers now have the option of flying on an LCC.
1 Thus, since fares in most city-pairs are now subject to price competition from LCCs, large network carriers are likely to increasingly seek ways to differentiate their product from LCCs in terms of product quality.
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Another key structural change in the U.S. airline industry has been the growing importance of regional carriers in providing services on behalf of large network carriers (for example, American, Delta, United, US Airways). 3 Regional carriers are airlines that operate relatively smaller turbo-prop and regional jet "RJ" aircraft, typically with between 19 and 90 seats. Mainline 1 For example, in 2012, the number of domestic U.S. origin and destination passengers traveling on citypairs where LCCs had at least a 5 per cent share was over 75 per cent, up from 50 per cent in 1998. Source:
U.S. DOT DB1B database.
2 For example, in its Chapter 11 court filings, American Airlines recently noted that "Both United and Delta have announced significant investments in onboard product and service improvements, including installing lie-flat seating, adding additional high value seating, and providing more in-flight services such as on-board
Wi-Fi and personal entertainment centers. This, combined with the growth of our competitor networks, has helped our competitors compete for 'high value' customers in the face of ever-increasing LCC competition, and thus continue to maintain a healthy premium over low fares charged by this competition, while 3 Regional carriers operate the flights marketed under the "Delta Connection," "United Express," "US Airways Express," and "American Eagle" marketing brands of Delta, United, US Airways and American, respectively, during the sample period.
carriers contract with regional carriers using what are referred to as "capacity purchase agreements" (CPAs), whereby regional carriers adopt the two-letter marketing code and livery of their mainline partner in a way that is intended to be transparent to passengers, but where the mainline carrier dictates and controls virtually all aspects of the service, including which routes to fly, the flight schedule and aircraft type to used, as well as pricing and inventory management. As large network carriers began to experience reduced demand for their services in domestic markets (due to a combination of competition from LCCs and a decline in the overall demand for shorthaul traffic as a result of post-September 11 th "hassle factor"), regional carriers have played an increasingly important role in the "right-sizing" of the domestic networks of the large network carriers. This growing importance of regional carriers is evidenced by the fact that in 2012, regional carriers accounted for more than 60 per cent of all domestic flights marketed by the large network carriers.
Notwithstanding their growing importance in the product portfolios of the large network carriers, regional carriers are not perceived by all passengers as having an equivalent product quality as mainline service. For example, the operational performance of regional carriers (in terms of on-time performance, cancellations, etc.) has traditionally lagged that of the mainline carriers. 4 Likewise, many regional aircraft (particularly, those with 50 or fewer seats) are characterized by less spacious passenger cabins and have less overhead luggage space.
5
4 Forbes and Lederman (2010) also show that wholly-owned regional carriers typically have better operational performance than independent regional carriers.
5 See, for example "United one-ups small regional jets", USA Today, February 6, 2006: "There are plenty of reasons to hate 50-seat regional jets. You bang your head on the low ceiling. There's no room for carryon luggage because the overhead bins are no bigger than shoe boxes. Seating is all coach and so cramped that you might not be able to open your laptop. A passenger with a gazillion frequent-flier miles who normally flies first class can end up in the plane's last row."
As noted below, each of the large network carriers has re-configured each of their "large"
(greater than 50-seat) regional jets with first class seating. More recently, however, the "quality gap" between regional and mainline aircraft has been narrowed with the advent of larger RJs that mimic many aspects of narrow-body (single aisle) mainline aircraft. Moreover, each of the "large"
RJs currently deployed by the large network carriers are configured with both economy and first class seating.
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The purpose of our paper is to examine the quality choices of the large network carriers in response to competition from low cost carriers. The question of quality choices in response to entry in airline markets has been explored by Prince and Simon (2015) , which find lower on-time performance and hence lower quality of service by the incumbent carrier following either entry or the threat of entry by Southwest Airlines. Rather than on-time performance, which is observed by the traveler ex-post, this paper proposes two alternative measures of product quality that the traveler can observe before they purchase the ticket, both of which are set by the airline -relative seat density and proportion of first class seats. The relative seat density is the average number of seats on a particular aircraft type compared to the maximum seating capacity for the aircraft across all carriers. Unlike Prince and Simon (2015) which focus on routes that have experienced entry by Southwest or another LCC, this paper uses a panel of flights from 1998 to 2013 to examine the product quality differences across all airline routes both entered and not-entered by LCCs.
While it has been well documented that the presence of a LCC lowers fares (Brueckner, Lee, and Singer (2012) ) less well understood is how the presence of LCCs impacts the quality choices of large network carriers. One key factor in determining product quality choices can be 6
United Express large RJs include both regular economy and Economy Plus seating.
potential restrictions that firms face in making what might otherwise be "optimal" product quality choices. In the airline industry, for example, contractual restrictions contained in contracts between each of the large network carriers and their pilots known as "scope clauses" limit not only the size and number of regional aircraft a carrier can deploy, but in some cases, the routes on which regional aircraft can be flown. Thus, the empirical estimations include controls for both quarter and year effects to account for changes overtime in scope clauses that can restrict the types (size) and numbers of regional aircraft the large network carriers can deploy. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of aircraft choice, product quality, and pilot scope clauses. Section 3 includes a discussion of the data, entry events, and estimation results.
Concluding comments appear in Section 4.
Background on Aircraft Choices For Large Network Carriers
Both of our quality measures -seating density and proportion of first class seats are influenced by the type of aircraft operated by the large network carrier on the route. The fleets of the large network carriers are comprised of two principal types of aircraft: mainline and regional. Mainline aircraft are large jet aircraft (typically configured with more than 90 seats) that are operated by the mainline entity itself (for example, American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, United Airlines, and US Airways) using their own employees. For domestic services, the bulk of mainline flights are operated using a variety of narrow-body aircraft such as the Boeing 737/757, MD-80/88/90 or variants of the Airbus A320. For a given airline, the quality differences across different mainline aircraft deployed in domestic services are likely to be slight. Mainline carriers contract with regional carriers using CPAs, whereby the regional carriers adopt the marketing "code" and livery of their mainline partner in a way that is intended to be transparent to passengers, but where the mainline carrier dictates and controls virtually all aspects of the service, including which routes to fly, the flight schedule and aircraft type employed, as well as pricing and inventory management. Similarly, under a CPA, the mainline pays the regional carrier a fixed fee in exchange for operating the aircraft (regardless of the number of passengers onboard, or the fares they pay) and thus receives all of the ticket revenue. Thus, the mainline carrier assumes all of the risk associated with passenger demand, airfares and fuel price volatility.
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Over the past 15 years, the large network carriers have relied upon regional carriers to operate an increasing share of their short-and medium-haul domestic flights. For example, as shown in Figure 1 , the proportion of domestic flights marketed by the large network carriers but operated by their regional carrier partners has grown from 43 per cent in 1998 to 61 per cent 2012.
The shift towards a greater reliance on regional carriers on domestic routes is attributable to several factors. First, the growth of LCCs such as Southwest, JetBlue, AirTran, and Spirit is widely credited with transforming domestic airline service into commoditizing the industry. 
Aircraft Density Choice and Product Quality
The choice of aircraft seating density on a particular route depends on a variety of factors which may include distance, the mix of leisure/business traffic, the proportion of connecting versus "local" passengers, and the desired level of product quality. For example, although mainline aircraft have higher trip costs per flight (due to their larger size and higher hourly labor costs), they tend to have lower unit (for example, seat-mile) costs because of their greater fuel efficiency and the fact that operating costs are spread across a larger number of seats. As a result, mainline aircraft are typically deployed on routes with sufficient number of passengers to support the more costefficient mainline jet. Similarly, mainline aircraft are deployed on longer routes that are outside of the practical range of regional aircraft (longer than 1,500 mile). Regional aircraft, on the other hand, are frequently deployed on more thinly traveled routes, or on routes where a carrier wants to maintain a high level of flight frequency despite lower levels of traffic. be consistent with prior work by Prince and Simon (2015) which found worse on-time performance following LCC competition. On the other hand, a network carrier may choose to offer a higher quality product with lower seat density to differentiate its product from the LCC. Large network carriers have recently begun to retrofit aircraft to add seats and bring them in line with industry standards. The economy class seat in a Boeing 777 is 17" across, which is smaller than a stadium seat in the Barclays Center (19" across), Amtrak Coach (20.5"), and first class in Boeing 777 (21").
Pilot Scope Clauses
A key factor in a carrier's ability to alter its product quality (in terms of its mix of aircraft) are the various restrictions in their collective bargaining agreements with pilots' unions (known as "scope clauses") that limit the size and number of regional aircraft that a large network carrier can deploy within its regional operations. Prior to the round of restructuring (largely under Chapter 11) of the large network carriers that began in 2002, carriers were severely limited in the number of large RJs they could deploy, and some carriers (such as Continental) were prohibited from deploying RJs with greater than 50 seats altogether. Following their restructuring, however, each of the large network carriers gained varying degrees of "scope relief" that allowed them to deploy greater numbers (though still subject to certain limitations) of large RJs. aircraft. Figure 2 illustrates how the relaxation of a carrier's scope clause results in a substantial increase in the number of large RJ hours flown.
Estimation of Product Quality Choices
Our goal is to empirically examine how product quality choices by airlines vary across routes in response to competition by LCCs. In particular, we seek to determine how the route-level product quality choices by the large network carriers when competing with Southwest Airlines and more generally with any LCC. To this end, we estimate a series of reduced form regressions with product quality serving as the dependent variable along with several key variables which are likely to influence the product quality selection. (2014)), we use city-pairs as our unit of observation. Hence we examine both network carrier and LCC competition in the city-pair market. 25 In addition to quality choices made by airlines on a route-by-route level, since network carriers also make quality choices on a fleet-wide level, we also include a fleet-wide LCC exposure variable in the estimations to account for the average level of competition across routes. This variable represents the proportion of a network carrier flights in city-pair markets that have LCC competition.
The Data and Summary Statistics
For each route-carrier-quarter observation, we compute the average seat density by comparing the aircraft seating capacity with the maximum observed seating capacity for the identical aircraft across all airlines in the same year. For example, Spirit Airlines configured its 25 Several studies (for example, Singer (2013, 2014) , Morrison (2001) have shown that competition by an LCC in an adjacent airport-pair market has a substantial effect on airline behavior.
However for tractability, our analysis focuses on city-pairs.
specific densities on aircraft deployed by a carrier on the city-pair in question each quarter. We also calculate a second service quality measure -the average proportion of first class and business class seats for the identical aircraft.
We are interested in assessing how a large network carrier alters its product quality given the presence of an LCC on the city-pair market. Shaked and Sutton (1982) suggest that when two firms with similar products compete, the equilibrium outcome which ensures positive economic profits is for the firms to reposition their products by offering distinct qualities. To eliminate routes with infrequent service, we only include domestic city-pair markets that average at least one daily scheduled departure. Since Brueckner, Lee, and Singer (2013) found that presence by Southwest results in substantially greater downward pressure on fares than other LCCs, we include separate indicator variables for the presence of each low cost carrier. 2627 Since airline schedules are set well in advance of the service actually being offered, consumers can determine the product quality (relative seat density or proportion of first and business class seats) prior to departure. This is a marked difference from prior work by Prince and Simon (2015) which linked on-time performance and product quality since on-time performance is not revealed to the consumer until after the flight has occurred.
Seat density varies substantially across carriers and within a carrier over our sample period. Figure 3 shows the differences in seating density on a given aircraft type (Airbus A-320) across carriers. Spirit Airlines has considerably higher seating density 178 seats, compared to the large network carriers Delta (150 seats) and United (144 to 150 seats).
A second illustration of seating differences across carriers is provided by the Boeing 737-800 in Figure 4 . Southwest Airlines has the highest seat density for this aircraft at 175 seats. In and only two percent of entry occurring on routes with non-stop service by three or more large network carriers.
Econometric Specification
Our goal is to assess changes in product quality of large network carriers to competition from LCCs. Hence, we begin by estimating the following baseline model:
where Y is the dependent variable that measures product quality for each carrier. Our two measures of quality are seat density and proportion of first class seats. Density is the natural logarithm of the average relative seat density of network carrier i in quarter t in city-pair route r relative to the maximum seating capacity employed across all airlines for the particular aircraft type on the route in that year. Our second quality measure 1 st class % is the proportion of first and business class seats in the aircraft. Also, β represents the estimated regression coefficients of , a vector of route characteristics that likely impact the quality decision. We use to represent the estimated regression coefficients of , a vector of indicator variables which indicate the presence of LCC j at quarter t in the city-pair route r. Likewise, indicates the estimated regression coefficients of LCC exposure, which represents the proportion of network carrier i's flights that are exposed to LCC competition in the city-pair during quarter t. The inclusion of Year and Quarter fixed effects enables us to control for both changes in seating configuration and fleet composition over time and potential seasonal changes in seat density. The Year and Quarter fixed effects are particularly needed in the estimation given the proliferation of regional jets during the sample period along with the relaxing of pilot scope clause restrictions post-9/11 (see Figure 2 ). We present separate estimations with and without city-pair Route fixed effects since the inclusion of Route wipes away all route variables that do not change over time in our sample (for example, temperature differences between city-pairs, distance between airports). In addition to temperature difference and distance, we also include the natural logarithm of the geometric mean of both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) population and income at origination and destination. The final route characteristic included in vector X is the number of network competitors who are serving the same city-pair. This enables an additional measure of route competition above and beyond the presence of an LCC on the route.
The above specification is used to estimate each of the six large network carriers separately for the sixteen year sample period (1998-2013) followed by a joint estimation for all network carriers. This specification allows us to separately examine how each network carrier responds to route competition from both other network carriers and competition from LCCs. Second, what is more important to network carriers than the overall LCC exposure is the composition of the LCC competition. The presence of the largest LCC, Southwest Airlines in a city-pair market significantly reduces seat density (improves the product quality) for most network carriers. Due to the log density specification in Table 3, of Southwest city-pair routes are served by American. The entries in bold from Table 4 indicate the network carrier with the greatest overlap with a particular LCC. American is also the network carrier with the most overlap with Southwest Airlines, hence it is not surprising that American has the largest reduction in density of any network carrier on routes with a Southwest presence. American is also the network carrier with the highest overlap with Spirit Airlines. Once again, American has significantly lower density (3.0 percent) and hence higher product quality on routes served by Spirit. The one network carrier that has chosen to add density on routes with a substantial LCC presence is Northwest Airlines. We find that Northwest
Estimation Results
Airlines increases seat density (hence lower quality) by 1.6 percent given the presence of Sun Country. Given that Allegiant has little multimarket contact with any network carrier ( for example, United has the largest network carrier presence appearing in less than ten percent of Allegiant routes), we find that the presence of Allegiant has minimal impact on seat density of any network carrier.
As previously discussed, network carriers respond to the presence of LCC competition when there is considerable multi-market contact by adjusting seat density. Specifically, most network carriers (other than Northwest) offer higher product quality in response to LCC competition. These competitive responses, however, are limited to the presence of low cost carriers. Hence our fourth finding is that the source of competition matters, since seating capacity of network carriers is largely independent of the amount of network carrier competition on the city-pair route. These findings are consistent with Brueckner, Lee, and Singer (2013) who report that competition between network carriers generates minimal price changes.
Fifth, and finally, Table 3 shows that network carriers have significantly lower density (higher quality) on longer distance routes. As a robustness check, we include route fixed effects in the estimations (see appendix). These additional market controls drain the explanatory power and reduce the magnitude of most coefficients estimates by about 50 percent. Hence the aggregated results across all carriers are qualitatively similar yet quantitatively smaller.
Proportion of 1 st Class and Business Class Seats
Next we examine a second measure of product quality -the proportion of 1 st class and business class seats in the aircraft. While one would expect the findings to be similar to the seat density results since the proportion of business class seats is highly correlated with seat density, however, these two quality measures are not identical. The proportion of 1 st class and business class seats is a measure of the proportion of high quality seats offered within the aircraft. Whereas density is constructed by comparing the number of aircraft seats to the maximum possible seating configuration for that aircraft model across carriers. For example, a carrier could retrofit an aircraft by installing thinner seats with less seat pitch in economy to create room for an additional row of business class seats, hence substantially increasing the proportion of business class seats while only modestly increasing seat density. The empirical results for the proportion of 1 st class and business class seats are similar to the seat density findings since all five takeaways previously discussed still hold.
Unlike seat density where negative coefficients indicate higher product quality, now positive coefficients for the proportion of 1 st class and business class seats indicate higher quality in Table 5 . We find once again network carriers have no clear cut consensus on how to adjust product quality from an increase in system-wide LCC exposure. Some network carriers (American, Delta, United, and Northwest) have chosen to increase the percentage of 1 st class and business class seats in response to greater LCC exposure, while other network carriers (Continental and US Airways) have opted to reduce their proportion of premium seating following more LCC exposure.
What is more important than the overall LCC exposure is the presence of Southwest Airlines. We find that for the five network carriers with largest city-pair overlap with Southwest
Airlines (see Table 4 Network carriers are also responsive to competition from non-Southwest LCCs when there is considerable market overlap between the two competitors (see Table 5 ). We find that network carriers are increasing the proportion of 1 st class and business class seats in response to a significant presence of a competing LCC. For example, American has the most overlap with Spirit Airlines.
We find that American responds to the presence of Spirit by increasing the proportion of its 1 st class and business class seats by 2.0 per cent. Also, Delta is the legacy carrier with the most overlap with AirTran and we find similar results as the presence of AirTran drives Delta to offer 3.1 percent more 1 st class and business class seats. In a similar fashion United responds to Frontier's presence by also increasing the proportion of 1 st class and business class seats by 2.0 percent. Delta doesn't appear to adjust the proportion of first class/business class seats given the presence of JetBlue (we previously found a reduction in seat density by Delta on JetBlue routes). Likewise, we find no adjustment in the proportion of 1 st class and business class seats by Northwest in Sun Country routes.
As indicated in both Table 3 and Table 5 , American Airlines has the largest quality response among all network carriers to Southwest Airlines competition by reducing seat density (4.0 percent) and increasing 1 st class/business class seats (2.5 percent). We attribute this magnified response by American Airlines to the fact that American Airlines had the most variation in average seat density during the sample period (see Figure 6 ). American Airlines initiated, in 2001, the "More Room Through Coach" campaign (see Figure 4 ) in an effort to attract quality consensus coach travelers. In 2004, however, American Airlines discontinued the "More Room Through
Coach" program citing that seat availability at low prices is the predominant factor its consumers use when choosing a carrier.
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In sum, the source of the competition matters when network carriers are deciding how to adjust quality in response to competition from LCCs. We find that the presence of an LCC, especially an LCC with a large degree of overlapping markets, will prompt the typical large network carrier to improve product quality as measured by the proportion of 1 st class and business class seats. We find little product quality adjustments (as measured by the proportion of 1 st class and business class seats) due to the presence of other large network competitors. Finally, one other route characteristic matters in determining the proportion of first class/business class seats -route distance. We find that longer flights attract more first class and business class seats.
Conclusion
This paper examines how network carriers adjust product quality given the presence of an LCC along the route. While previous research has shown that product quality (measured by on-time performance) suffers from heightened competition by LCC (Prince and Simon, 2015) ) our results find the contrary. Given the presence of Southwest Airlines in their market, most network carriers typically differentiate themselves from their LCC competitors by offering higher product quality through lower seat density and more first class and business class seating. More generally, our result is consistent with Shaked and Sutton (1982) who suggest that it is profitable for two competing firms to reposition their products by offering distinct quality differences. Unlike service quality measures such as on-time performance or flight cancellations, our product quality measures are known to both the traveler and airline at the time that the ticket is purchased.
Beyond Southwest Airlines, we find that the quality response to other LCCs depends on the amount of market overlap between the network carrier and LCC. When there is considerable overlap between two competitors, network carriers are much more likely to offer higher product quality by reducing seating density and/or increasing the proportion of first class and business class seats. We find that competition from other network carriers prompts little product quality changes by the network airline. Finally, product quality is higher on longer distance routes. [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] where the LCC averages at least one daily departure on the city-pair route. The bolded entries above indicate the network carrier with the greatest overlap with a particular LCC. are clustered by airline market appear in parentheses. Market, year, and quarter fixed effects are included (yet not reported). * and ** represent statistical significance at the 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels, respectively.
